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Jun 19, 20261
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US Claims ASML EUV Chip Tool May Be in China; Dutch Maker Denies Allegation
U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick has told ASML executives he believes one of the Dutch company's EUV lithography machines—the only tools capable of printing advanced chip patterns—may have reached China in breach of export controls. ASML denies the allegation, stating no such machine has ever entered China, while U.S. officials claim evidence but have not disclosed it publicly.
Quick Facts
Who
Howard Lutnick
What
U.S. alleges ASML EUV machine may have been shipped to China
When
June 2026
Where
China
- U.S. alleges ASML EUV machine may have been shipped to China
- ASML denies any EUV machine exists or has ever existed in China
- U.S. officials claim evidence of EUV-related components and transport equipment shipped to China
- ASML tracks all shipped machines and maintains internal firewall restricting EUV access for China-based staff
- ASML sells older-generation deep ultraviolet tools to China legally
U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick has expressed concern to senior ASML executives that one of the Dutch chipmaker's extreme ultraviolet lithography machines may have reached China, according to Bloomberg reporting. Such a transfer would constitute a major breach of export controls that have prohibited ASML from selling EUV systems to China since the first Trump administration. Senior U.S. administration officials claim to have evidence that ASML shipped EUV-related components and transport equipment to China, though they have not disclosed this evidence to Bloomberg, ASML, or the Commerce Department.
ASML flatly denies the allegation, stating that no EUV machine has ever existed in China and none currently does. The company tracks every machine it has shipped and maintains that units are either in active use with monitored customers or have been dismantled and returned. CEO Christophe Fouquet explained in recent interviews that ASML implemented internal firewalls years ago separating employees with access to EUV technology from those without, and that the company's China-based staff are deliberately kept on the restricted side of this division.
The significance of this dispute extends far beyond ASML itself. The Dutch company is Europe's most valuable public company with a market capitalization near $700 billion, and it operates as a monopoly—the only supplier of EUV lithography machines on Earth. These tools are essential for manufacturing the most advanced semiconductor chips, including processors made by TSMC for Nvidia and Apple. The technology took ASML roughly two decades and billions in investment to develop, and no alternative supplier currently exists.
Fouquet has outlined the technical barriers to theft or reverse-engineering, noting that 80 percent of an EUV machine relies on decades of prior knowledge, while solving the central challenge of generating EUV light itself required 20 years of dedicated effort. He framed ASML's permitted sales of older-generation deep ultraviolet tools to China—expected to represent roughly 20 percent of 2026 revenue—as a strategic choice to maintain customer relationships while preserving the generational gap that protects ASML's competitive position and technological lead.
The dispute hinges on unresolved questions: the U.S. government has not publicly released the evidence it claims to possess, nor has it confirmed whether an actual complete EUV system exists on Chinese soil. The Commerce Department declined to respond to Bloomberg's inquiries about the specifics of its allegations. The stakes are exceptionally high, as even a single EUV machine reaching China would represent one of the most consequential breaches of the U.S. export-control regime designed to restrict advanced AI and semiconductor capabilities from reaching Beijing.
Why This Matters
This dispute centers on a potential breach of advanced semiconductor export controls with geopolitical consequences. ASML's EUV lithography monopoly makes it the gatekeeper of cutting-edge chip manufacturing—technology essential to AI and defense applications. If evidence of an EUV transfer is substantiated, it would represent one of the most consequential security violations in the U.S. export regime; if unsubstantiated, it signals serious trust erosion between Washington and allied Dutch technology leaders at a critical moment for semiconductor supply-chain security.